

## **Terrorism's Evolution: Yesterday, Today, and Forever**

*By Andrew Nichols Pratt*

In confronting the challenge of international terrorism, the first step is to call things by their proper names, to see clearly and say plainly who the terrorists are, what goals they seek, and which governments support them. What the terrorist does is kill, maim, kidnap, and torture. His or her victims may be children in the schoolroom, innocent travelers on airplanes, businessmen returning home from work, political leaders. . . . The terrorist's victims may have no particular political identity, or they may be political symbols, like Aldo Moro or, perhaps, Pope John Paul II. They may be kidnapped and held for ransom, maimed, or simply blown to bits. One defining characteristic of the terrorist is his choice of method; the terrorist chooses violence as the instrument of first resort.

*William Joseph Casey, US Director of Central Intelligence*<sup>1</sup>

Minoru Yamasaki, who designed the soaring World Trade Center that dominated Manhattan's skyline for three decades, intended this complex as a "living symbol of man's dedication to world peace."<sup>2</sup> On the beautiful clear morning of 11 September 2001, Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda—nineteen Salafi-Jihadist terrorists—simultaneously devastated this compelling symbol of peace while attacking a vibrant center of international cooperation, the cerebral cortex of American security and America's ordinary citizenry. Al Qaeda's actions that morning revealed at once the extent of their hatred for our democracy and our freedoms that this system protects. We must never forget the 2,975 souls from more than ninety nations who perished that day.<sup>3</sup> Like a virtual memorial, this attack should remind all democracies, not just the United States, that the price for freedom may reach as high as those sadly absent Twin Towers. However, of greater significance, 9/11 raised fundamental questions regarding how our societies must address this threat. The answers to these questions necessitate a thorough understanding of the history and causes of the terrorism phenomenon and of the extraordinary chapters that ensue in this text.

Without compromising our ideals, how do democratic societies recognize quite ordinary and unremarkable men, who harbor a virulent hatred for democracy; counter an organization opposed to democratic freedoms, yet which itself mimics Fortune 500 companies; and protect themselves from an ideology rooted in fanatical, seventh-century social practices, which today are goaded into lethal action by base and pernicious prejudice?<sup>4</sup> How does a democratic society coexist with a struggling, traditional culture overwhelmed by immoral western influences? And perhaps most significant, how do democracies address the considerable security problem confronting countries with growing immigrant populations, an undetermined percentage of whom are radicalized to the point of threatening violence? How do we defuse these potential terrorists whose nationality inscribed on a passport is of little consequence to the bearer, who identifies himself primarily by religion and a sense of primary allegiance to a transnational community; a question a Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS) colleague once posed? Europe contends with a potentially violent fifth column movement, but to date has experienced considerable difficulty in acknowledging this threat, let alone in dealing with this politically charged menace.<sup>5</sup>

While the purpose of this book is to address counterterrorism—its policies, strategies, campaigns, and current patterns and trends—for context, this effort must commence with a précis of the problem. Terrorism is a complex phenomenon; challenging to understand whether

you are a social scientist, a military commander, a diplomat, an intelligence officer, a political leader . . . or a student. Terrorism is a tactic used to socially, politically, and psychologically fragment a targeted population. These tactics created a line of development beginning in ancient times that can be traced and from which we will gain insights and knowledge. To begin to understand terrorists' behavior and their goals in order to craft counterterrorism policies, we must have a sense of terrorism's history. Terrorism, like a persistent cancer, has invaded our societies in the past; it afflicts us today; and terrorism will destroy our descendants correspondingly if we fail to grasp its fundamentals. Misunderstanding terrorism almost guarantees policy failures.

Of primary importance is our appreciation of how terrorism has mutated from a purely domestic, nation-specific problem into an "existential" threat to national security and international stability, as described by the former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair.<sup>6</sup> Terrorists' traditional motivation has been premeditated, political violence designed to influence an audience. The doyen of terrorism studies, Brian Jenkins, noted over thirty years ago, ". . . terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead." While his comment became an aphorism, Jenkins in 1999 acknowledged terrorism's dramatic transformation. The most recent attacks in New York, London, and Mumbai illustrate that terrorism's current goal is the achievement of the highest body count possible.<sup>7</sup> Four- or five-digit terrorism, or casualties greater than those of 9/11, appears to be the aim or measure of effectiveness sought by modern terrorists. But, while terrorism's blood craving has grown, terrorism's nature endures. The essence of terrorism remains the acquisition and retention of power. Terrorism is always political, a direct challenge to the polity, and to the state's legitimacy and authority, even when other motives such as religion, criminality, or psychology are involved.

To counter terrorism, one must understand terrorism for what it really is—a deliberate choice—neither the product of inflamed passion, the environment of war, nor of the strength of feeling sustaining a cause. Terrorism is a method, not a description.<sup>8</sup> Since the dawn of history, all acts of terrorism or terrorist campaigns are designed to promote publicity while creating fear, panic, and the prospect to seize power.

But what makes terrorism so imperative for us to understand today as an existential threat, as the former British Prime Minister Blair warned, are the terrorists' modern weapons. In one sense, terrorism's history can be represented in a simple chronological progression that presents the terrorists' weapons of choice: daggers, garrotes, guns, explosives, and at present, weapons of mass destruction. We will commence our sojourn through terrorism's history by talking about the terrorists who discriminately murdered their victims with daggers, and we will conclude with comments about modern terrorists who combine a desire to attack indiscriminately on a global stage with both the capability and the motivation of using weapons of mass destruction.

### ***First Quest: Defining Our Threat***

We must begin our quest by developing a working definition of terrorism for this text; for use while at the Marshall Center; and—we suggest—for professionals. We will launch with seven simple cases to which we must ask, "Was this an act of terrorism or some other form of violent activity?"

1. From 1933 to 1945, Nazi Germany slaughtered six million Jews throughout Europe and Eurasia;

2. In late December 1937, the Japanese Imperial Army raped and murdered over 260,000 Chinese in a senseless orgy of violence;
3. On 6 August 1945, a lone US Army Air Corps B-29 attacked Hiroshima with an atomic bomb; approximately forty-five thousand Japanese died in a flash and many tens of thousands died later;
4. On 12 October 2000, a small rubber boat with two waving occupants motored alongside the USS Cole (DDG 67), an American warship harbored in the Yemeni port of Aden, and exploded, blowing a hole in its side, killing seventeen sailors and injuring thirty-nine;
5. On 19 September 2006, Robert Redeker, a public high school philosophy teacher and writer near Toulouse, wrote in the newspaper *Le Figaro* that Mohammad was “a merciless warlord, a looter, a mass-murderer of Jews and a polygamist.” He also called the Koran “a book of incredible violence,” comparing Islam unfavorably with Christianity and Judaism and criticizing the hostile reaction to a speech by Pope Benedict XVI. Redeker, his wife, and children immediately received death threats by telephone, e-mail, and on the Internet forum that published photos of him, a home address, directions to his home, and his cell phone number. That day’s issue of *Le Figaro* was banned in Egypt and Tunisia and a contributor to *Al Hesbah* wrote “May God send some lion to cut his head.”<sup>9</sup>
6. On 5 April 2007, Second Lieutenant Joanna Dyer and three other British soldiers perished from a roadside bomb while on patrol in Basra, Iraq. Former Prime Minister Blair labeled the ambush an “act of terrorism,” suggesting its perpetrators were linked to Iran;<sup>10</sup> and
7. On 27 October 2008, Islamist rebels stoned to death thirteen-year-old Aisha Ibrahim Duhulow . . . for being raped. Begging for mercy moments before being buried up to her shoulders and her horrific execution, the Somali youngster is said to have pleaded “Don’t kill me, don’t kill me” in front of a thousand-strong crowd.<sup>11</sup>

We shall return to these seven cases later in this chapter.

Defining terrorism has proven to be difficult even for one country, let alone regional organizations or global bodies. A definition overtly describes our approaches to the problem of terrorism and profoundly influences how we respond to it. (Please find examples for a definition in the original version of this article.) If terrorism is always considered a crime (as distinct from war), then in America, the Justice Department and the police are responsible for combating it, and it is difficult legally to call on the military in incidents on US territory, even in situations (such as those involving chemical or biological agents) for which only the military is trained to respond.<sup>12</sup> If terms such as “unlawful,” or “against persons or property,” are found in the text as in the foregoing definition used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, we can surmise a “legal” or “judicial” approach will be taken to the terrorism problem. This type of approach entails the application of the rule of law in which evidentiary practices apply; law enforcement means are practiced; and imprisonment will serve to bring the terrorist criminals to justice.

Terms such as “politically motivated violence” or “to intimidate governments” as depicted above imply a political-military approach. Evidentiary practices need not necessarily be followed. While intelligence could fail to meet the higher threshold of evidence, a democratically elected political leader can act on reasonable intelligence that might not meet the highest standards of a court. In fact, a leader may be morally or constitutionally obliged to act. While

“politically incorrect” in some circles, the use of overwhelming military force can be a political-military solution to some terrorism, as the campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka has so vividly demonstrated. And while not immediately a matter of definition, we should remember that no campaign intended to eliminate terrorism has ever been successful without first eliminating terrorists.

Concomitantly, a nation’s definition normally reflects its history of fighting terrorism. The United Kingdom’s decades-long campaign against the Belfast-based “Provisionals,” who vowed to use violence as a catalyst for unification, played out in Northern Ireland, in Great Britain, in the Republic of Ireland, as well as in Europe. Consequently, both the United Kingdom’s old and post-9/11 definitions of terrorism described “putting the public in fear” locally, as well as “outside” the United Kingdom.<sup>13</sup> One’s experience with terrorism shapes one’s definition of terrorism.

Additionally, geostrategic shifts can impact upon a definitional construction. Russia introduced a Security Council resolution in 2004 that expanded the definition of terrorism to include Chechen and Palestinian groups, enlarging the list of terrorist individuals and groups beyond those linked to al Qaeda and the Taliban by United Nations Security Resolution 1267.<sup>14</sup> Russia proposed terrorism be described as “any act intended to cause death or serious injury to civilians or taking of hostages” to compel action. Such acts “are under no circumstance justifiable by consideration of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or similar nature.” In so acting, Russia abruptly reversed decades of support for terrorists fighting for territory and self-determination. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared, “The time has come to renounce the double standard once and for all when it comes to terror, no matter what slogans it uses.”<sup>15</sup>

Our definitional challenge impels us to arrive at as complete and objective definition of terrorism as possible; one acceptable for academic research as well as for facilitating counterterrorist operations on an international scale.<sup>16</sup> To accomplish this, we can apply a Clausewitzian-like approach to defining terrorism based on three important elements:<sup>17</sup>

1. The aim of the action, which is always political—that is, to gain or to maintain political objectives, changing a regime, changing the people in power, or changing social or economic policies;
2. The essence of the action—that is, the use of or threat to use violence to influence a broader audience as opposed to nonviolent protest such as strikes, peaceful demonstrations, or tax revolts; and
3. The target of the action—that is, civilians. Terrorism is distinguished from other types of political violence such as guerrilla warfare and civil insurrection by the intentional targeting of civilians.

As Boaz Ganor has noted during his visits to the Marshall Center, terrorism exploits the relative vulnerability of the civilian “underbelly” and is not the result of an accidental injury inflicted on a civilian or a group of civilians who stumbled into an area of violent activity.<sup>18</sup> While a literal copy of this Clausewitzian-like approach to defining terrorism is not necessary, any sound definition of terrorism should address these three elements in some analogous manner. Furthermore, as a security official peruses an intelligence report or examines the scene of an attack, applying this definitional approach will be equally beneficial. However, our global community still cannot arrive at a simple definition that satisfies all.

The impasse in arriving at a universal definition of terrorism nurtured over time the myth that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” and to the longevity of this twaddle.<sup>19</sup> This cliché is trite as well as a false dichotomy. The term “freedom fighter” has to do with ends such as Euskadi Ta Askatasuna’s (ETA) secessionist goal of freeing the Basque people from control by Spain. Terrorism connotes the means of achieving this goal. To reiterate, terrorism is a tactic; it is a method. Hence, an individual can claim the mantle of freedom fighter using terrorism to achieve his purposes; however, in reality he is simply a terrorist.

The genesis of this enduring myth is in the United Nations’ “crisis of identity” suffered during the Cold War. This saga plays out in the first pages of Rolf Ekeus’s discussion of the United Nations’ contemporary challenges. A portion of the UN’s membership still adhered to ideologies or doctrines that rejected human rights and supported the absolute authority of the state. The United Nations’ body fractured between the democratic West and the authoritarian East. The upshot found the Security Council evolving into a debating society and the General Assembly transforming into a stage for “a beauty contest in which both sides wooed for political favors from the nonaligned.”<sup>20</sup> Aroused in the early 1970s by a wave of letter bombs, the Lod airport attack in Israel, and, finally, the Munich massacre, UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim enjoined the United Nations to define terrorism in order to punish these perpetrators. Simultaneously, “wars of national liberation” were being discussed in New York and were perceived by the Soviet Union and many developing nations as classic cases of “just war.” This argument was accepted, along with a perverted corollary that those “in the right” were released from the normative rules of warfare. Thus, it proved too difficult to outlaw the activities of international terrorists. The United Nations’ Sixth Committee legal commentators at this time such as Mr. Joewono, an Indonesian, and Dr. Abu Lughod, a Palestinian, contended that national liberation movements, because of their legitimate *jus ad bellum*, should be treated as privileged belligerents and absolved from the restraints of the humanitarian rules of war. In a grotesque perversion of logic, they argued, “It would be unjust to expect such peoples to adhere to the same code of ethics as those who possessed more sophisticated means of advancing their interests.”<sup>21</sup>

If one truly appreciates international law, one man’s terrorist can never be another man’s freedom fighter. Although fashionable at conferences and cocktail parties, this expression serves at best as a weak lecture transition sentence or merely an empty witticism between neophytes. Murderers of young children are never “freedom fighters.” If they were ever entitled to such a distinction, we would then have to concede that international law itself was nothing more than an authorization to commit evil in world affairs.<sup>22</sup> So let us return to our seven cases that we questioned earlier.

Words have meaning and the term “terrorism” regrettably for decades has been used promiscuously. Nazi Germany’s slaughter of 6 million Jews throughout Europe and Eurasia represented an unparalleled genocide. The rape of Nanking by the Japanese Imperial Army described a depraved war crime directed from the highest echelons of the Imperial Japanese Army. The first use of the atomic bomb by the United States on Hiroshima, which killed tens of thousands of Japanese, approached the model of war that Clausewitz once defined as “absolute” war and was the Allies’ “best worst option” to end World War II. From extensive research, the United States’ best course of action targeted the mind of Emperor Hirohito and his decision-making structure and not innocents.<sup>23</sup> The year 2000 attack on USS Cole (DDG 67) resists a facile description. The Cole sailed under “Threat Condition Bravo,” the second-lowest condition on a scale of four, so only a handful of sailors were posted on deck as it refueled. Crucially, the weapons systems on the bow and stern were unmanned because of the relatively low level of

alert. Reminiscent of TV's amusing but ineffectual deputy sheriff Barney Fife of Mayberry, two sailors patrolled the ship with pistols with two rounds each and instructions not to load their weapons or fire unless fired on, and then only after being given the captain's permission. Given the nature of the ship's duties, a terrorist attack best describes this case. However, some critics have pointed out that under US law an attack against a military target does not meet the legal definition of terrorism (see: 22 USC § 2656f(d)(2)). Nonetheless, at the end of the day, the intent of this attack furthered al Qaida's political goals.<sup>24</sup> The case of Robert Redeker, while not archetypal terrorism, threatened bloodshed for political purposes against civilians, which amounts to an act of terrorism. Second Lt. Joanna Dyer and her fellow British soldiers died fighting a sophisticated, Iranian-supported insurgency, though their deaths were not the result of an "act of terrorism" as suggested by an understandably emotional British Prime Minister Blair. Finally, the gruesome stoning murder of thirteen-year-old Aisha Ibrahim Duhulow before a crowd depicted a horrific act of terrorism by a group of Salafi-Jihadists that was designed to dramatically intimidate local Somali citizens.

"Terrorism" loses consequence and gravitas if misused, and words such as "genocide" are, in fact, more egregious. We should examine terrorist cases focusing upon the act itself and neither its perpetrators nor the alleged probity of its cause. Now with our definition of terrorism, we will examine the nature of this pernicious phenomenon.

### ***Terrorism's Historic Roots: Today's Antecedents***

The events of New York City, Bali, Beslan, Madrid, London, and Mumbai have placed terrorism's brutal realities on center stage before a global audience. An effective way to examine terrorism's nature is to see it as part of an unfolding historical process. Terrorism is a form of political warfare and, like war itself, retains its constant nature, but its causes, objectives, and motivations evolve. The following brief treatment of terrorism's history will illuminate its enduring nature.

With certain irony, the first known terrorist group was a Jewish group called the Sicarii, an extremist offshoot of the religious sect of Zealots who attempted to expel the Romans and their Jewish collaborators from the Judean region and introduced terrorism as a strategy from approximately AD 66 to 73. The name "Sicarii" comes from the short sword or sica, their preferred weapon. Josephus, a first-century Jewish historian, provides our sparse history of the Sicarii and their unorthodox tactics: killing during daylight in crowded places to demonstrate the Roman Empire and Jewish kingdom's impotence; attacking in order to strike fear beyond their immediate targets; and acting in an apparent random nature. The Sicarii's high-risk assaults were conducted to demonstrate the vulnerability of the region's ruling elites. When their tolerance expired, the Romans crucified two thousand people and thus ended our first case.<sup>25</sup>

Next, the Assassins, an offshoot of the Ismaili sect, terrorized the Middle East during the eleventh–thirteenth centuries. Founded by Hassan-es Sabbah in the Elburz Mountains in Persia, this cult later expanded to Syria following the Mongol invasion of Persia. Operating remarkably like today's Salafi-Jihadist enterprise, the Assassins killed apostates: Muslim prefects, governors, caliphs, and even Conrad, the Crusader King of Jerusalem. Twice their leader, known in legend as "The Old Man of the Mountain," attempted to assassinate Saladin. The Assassins preferred the dagger. They courted death purportedly motivated by hashish-induced visions of paradise and were encouraged to believe nothing and dare all.<sup>26</sup> The Assassins were initially suppressed by the Mongols and later destroyed in 1272 by the Muslim leader al-Malik Baybars al-Bunduqdari, an important Mamluk Sultan of Egypt and Syria.<sup>27</sup>

The third terrorist group worthy of mention is the Thuggee. Some question the extent of the religious dimension of Thuggee; however, most contemporary sources have described them as being a Hindi religious cult, devotees of Kali, a Hindu goddess of destruction whose aims were imperceptible. Some revisionist sources consider the Thuggee a specialized form of organized crime or paramilitary activity like a modern mafia lacking any particular religious dimension. The Thuggee's centuries-long campaign ended under British rule in the 1830s, but not before this criminal terrorist group had killed as many as two million people; the group would rivet our attention if only 10 percent of that figure had died. The Thuggee strangled their victims with silk garrotes; murdered travelers who were rarely English; and attacked large areas in an indiscriminate manner. Early attempts at prosecuting and eliminating the Thuggee failed due to the lack of evidence for their crimes. Their modus operandi yielded very little evidence: no witnesses to interrogate, no weapons to examine, and no corpses. Furthermore, the Thuggee usually made no confessions when captured. Another obstacle to prosecution was that Thuggee groups did not act locally, but attacked all over the Indian subcontinent, including territories not under British rule. In a survey of political terrorism, the Thuggee rate no more than a footnote except for the sheer number of casualties.<sup>28</sup>

The last historic terrorist group we treat is the Narodnaya Volya. They functioned from January 1878 until March 1881 and arguably represent terrorism's most successful organization.<sup>29</sup> Walter Laqueur writes that the moral and intellectual distance between Narodnaya Volya and contemporary terrorists can be measured in light years.<sup>30</sup> Their motto proclaimed, "Not one drop of unnecessary blood!"<sup>31</sup> Sofya Perovskaya, Narodnaya Volya's most famous terrorist—who directed Czar Alexander's murder—was not unlike leaders of the Bader Meinhof, Red Brigades, or even al Qaeda. A disaffected child of the ruling class with a grudge, she hated her own. Perovskaya wanted the Russian society to compress like an overtightened spring so when it finally popped, it would break.

This was the classic era of anarchist terrorism that lasted from about 1880 to the end of World War I. Some scholars suggest a comparison is warranted between present-day terrorism and its nineteenth-century predecessor.<sup>32</sup> In 1906 alone, approximately thirtysix hundred government officials were killed or wounded by terrorists. Acts of terrorism became so common during this period that many Russian newspapers introduced special sections devoted solely to printing daily lists of political assassinations and bombings throughout the empire.<sup>33</sup> As we now know only too well, the spring finally did break in 1917 with the Bolshevik revolution, but by then Perovskaya had been hanged for murder.

### ***Terrorism: The Tool of the Radical Left and Right***

Political terrorism—not to be confused with criminal terrorism and pathological terrorism—is systematic violence used in the furtherance of political aims, often by small groups dedicated to a specific agenda, usually involving attacks upon the governing authorities.<sup>34</sup> Political terrorism emanates from the left and right political spectrums and from political motivations in between. Thus, distinctions between political and ethnic terrorism occasionally blur as some separatist groups are influenced by, or receive support from, the left, despite being nationalists. Terrorism in an outlying region or colony is often assumed to be separatist in its logic, though loyalist terrorists have been opposed to the exclusion of Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom. The left and the right occasionally clash with right-wing terrorists seeking to defend the status quo. This has occurred, for example, in Colombia, where the activities of the leftist Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)

precipitated terrorist atrocities by the preservationist rightist United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, or the AUC, the country's largest paramilitary group.<sup>35</sup> Positioning themselves as a necessary counter to Colombia's leftist insurgents, ordinary Colombians were often victimized—instead of protected—by the AUC. The armed groups displaced indigenous communities from their land, massacred civilians, and kidnapped political figures. As human rights groups have documented, some paramilitaries even charged “taxes” in local areas and regulated how citizens could dress.<sup>36</sup>

In the United States, prior to the modern era of religiously motivated terrorism begun by terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center complex, the right wing represented American law enforcement's greatest challenge. During the American Revolutionary War, Loyalists suffered being tarred, feathered, and lynched by revolutionary mobs. A form of political cleansing divided entire families with family members who remained loyal to the king escaping to Canada and members loyal to the fledgling revolutionary American government occupying their kin's estates to this day.<sup>37</sup>

America's most infamous right-wing terrorist organization, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), emerged from the American Civil War and was initially led by the South's greatest tactician, General Nathan Bedford Forrest. Initially, the KKK opposed northern occupation, the Reconstruction, and the Black vote with lynching being the order of the day. The Klan became a nationwide phenomenon enjoying its largest political successes not in the South but in Colorado and Indiana and as far north as Maine, attacking not just Freedmen, but Jews and other minorities as well as intimidating and opposing Roman Catholics and labor unions. America contended with other manifestations of terrorism during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: the Molly Maguires in the 1860s and 1870s; the Ludlow Massacre of Greek, Italian, and other immigrants; and, the infamous West Virginia Miners' Rebellion, which introduced the term “redneck” as well as the use of close air support by the fledgling US Army Air Corps.<sup>38</sup>

Right-wing extremists and terrorists appear to be experiencing a reincarnation of sorts. Our global economic downturn, the flood of illegal Third World migrants into the First World, and the election of America's first black president are contributing to a resurgence of right-wing extremist groups. In the United States, right-wing extremism had been on the wane since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. However, according to a US intelligence assessment distributed by the Department of Homeland Security, this trend has reversed.<sup>39</sup> Europe is also experiencing a similar resurgence in right-wing violence. The German Federal Police Office (BKA) affirmed Germany's far-right threat is increasing, with the number of violent offenses committed by neo-Nazis climbing steeply. Germany is witnessing a revival of indisputable xenophobic violence and racism; not incidents blown out of proportion by a media all too aware that headlines about Nazis sell newspapers. Between January and August of 2006 alone there were some eight thousand offenses by right-wing radicals reported to the BKA—20 percent more than the previous year and 50 percent more than in 2004. While many pundits dismiss the regular reports of xenophobic violence as scare-mongering, statistics published by the German Interior Ministry prove that the far-right's gloves are indeed off.<sup>40</sup>

Addressing the left, the late 1950s and early 1960s heralded the birth of global radical left-wing terrorism due in part to the availability of arms, the spread of mass communications, and the decline of substantive political debate. The world had suffered two world wars and numerous rebellions causing the globe to be awash with cheap weapons. What we call globalization today arguably developed during this period with cheap air travel permitting mobility and instant communications available to millions. Serious political debate succumbed to

simplistic sloganeering: “Make love, not war,” “Imagine No Religion,” and “More power to the people.” However, left-wing terrorists shunned this naïveté and were heavily influenced by anticolonial struggles in Indochina, Algeria, and Africa. A shared, loosely fashioned, vaguely defined socialist ideology developed during this period, allowing such odd temporary coalitions as the one that formed between Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) active service units, Ilich Ramírez Sánchez (aka Carlos the Jackal), an affluent Venezuelan-born, leftist revolutionary, and his German partners. Carlos formulated the attack on the headquarters of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna in December 1975, leading an all-star cast of terrorists, which included Gabriele Kröcher-Tiedemann of the second-generation Red Army Faction in the assault seizing over sixty hostages. This liberal socialist ideology did forge ties that still bind to this day. However, anti-Semitism and a pragmatic need for operational and tactical expertise also bound these anomalous bedfellows. Perhaps the most enduring regional relationship was forged by Northern Ireland’s Republican terrorist movement and the PLO. This too dated from the early 1970s, when Fatah organized weapons and terrorist training for PIRA and INLA operatives in Libya and Lebanon.<sup>41</sup>

These left-wing terrorist groups mushroomed during this period, organizing themselves hierarchically while normally adhering to severe discipline and command lines. Their extreme security paranoia is best exemplified by the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), also known as the Fatah Revolutionary Council. By 1987, Abu Nidal (the pseudonym of Sabri Khalil al-Banna) had turned the full force of his terror tactics inwards on the ANO itself. Members were tortured until they confessed to betrayal and disloyalty. According to recruits who were able to escape, victims were buried alive, fed through a tube forced into their mouths, then finally killed by a bullet fired down the tube. Some had their genitals placed in skillets of boiling-hot oil. There were several mass purges. During one night in November 1987, 170 ANO members were tied up, blindfolded, machine-gunned, and buried in a mass grave. Another 160 met the same fate in Libya shortly afterwards.<sup>42</sup>

Fortunately for us, left-wing terrorists lost sight of their intended audience and goals. For the left-wing terrorist of this era, terrorism was a tactic that became a strategy and a strategy that over time eventually became their reason for existing—a *raison d’être*. Terrorism moved from being a tool, to an end, to finally a way of life without gaining any lucidity, coherence, or depth. These groups eventually collapsed under the weight of their own inadequacy, unable to accomplish the broad social tasks that their terrorist tactics were never meant to achieve. Left-wing terrorist groups such as the Japanese Red Army, an army of approximately forty terrorists, could never realistically achieve its goal to overthrow the Japanese government and emperor and start a global revolution. The more presumptuous a terrorist group’s claim and the more extensive its desired constituency, the greater is the terrorist’s chance of failure.

Nevertheless, while suffering from internal pathogens, these terrorist organizations and their successors waged and some continue to wage today a thriving psychological warfare campaign using the media and “. . . the oxygen of publicity.”<sup>43</sup> Political terrorism became a form of psychological warfare waged through the media. On 10 September 1976, in New York City, five Fighters for Free Croatia (CFF) hijacked TWA Flight 355 and journeyed from New York to Canada, on to Iceland, and over London, dropping pamphlets. The flight eventually terminated in Paris, where the terrorists were arrested.<sup>44</sup> At the end of this thirty-hour odyssey, one of the terrorists, as he was being led away, off-handedly intoned, “Well, that’s show biz.” It certainly was theater. A \$400 investment in five plane tickets from New York to Chicago leveraged millions of dollars of free publicity for the political cause of the Fighters for Free Croatia.<sup>45</sup>

Mass media do not merely cover terrorism; terrorists plan on such coverage. Yasser Arafat, a master terrorist and manipulator of the media, selected the 1972 Munich Olympics as a target to reinvigorate world attention on the plight of the Palestinians as these games were the first “live” internationally televised sporting event in history. The Red Brigades attempted to conduct their attacks to make the deadline for the much-favored Italian Sunday papers. American terrorist Timothy McVeigh selected the Murrah Federal Building specifically because it had “plenty of open space around it to allow for the best possible news photos and television footage.”<sup>46</sup> That bin Laden demonstrated his ability to reach a global audience, foist his picture onto every cable news channel, displace presidential election chatter on nightly news, and garner the attention of the Sunday pundits, astounds. His videos are pure propaganda, designed to weaken American resolve, while fostering recruiting and fund-raising.

As a key component of psychological warfare, the media can also shape the outcome of a terrorist incident because sustained coverage of a hostage situation can protect lives by building international sympathy for the hostages’ plight. However, a government can be pressured to resolve the situation, perhaps prematurely as was the case with the Ma’alot massacre in northern Israel on 15 May 1974.<sup>47</sup> The media can disrupt or even prevent a dynamic counterterrorism operation. During the Hanafi siege in mid-March, 1977, three buildings in Washington, D.C., were seized by twelve terrorists who were tipped off to the hostage rescue force’s actions by live TV media coverage. Conversely, inadvertent assistance to law enforcement agencies by the media is also possible. The Unabomber’s seventeen-year campaign ended when major US newspapers published his Luddite political manifesto, which Theodore Kaczynski’s brother David fortuitously recognized.

Before we leave our discussion of terrorism from the left and right and begin our discussion of “Holy Terror” or killing in the name of God, be aware that religious terrorism also practices psychological warfare.<sup>48</sup> Violent Islamist doctrine requires its believers to accept jihad as continuous process warfare: psychological, political, and military.<sup>49</sup> This theme will recur later in this text.

### ***“Holy Terror”: Killing in the Name of God***

While other forms of terrorism appear interested in influencing contemporary society through violence or the threat of violence against civilians, religious terrorists exhibit a fundamental difference when compared to their political cousins. Religiously motivated terrorists usually seek little or no dialogue with contemporary society and wish only to eliminate its modernizing influences. For the most part, religious terrorists are hierarchical and authoritarian. The true believer experiences no ethical conflict from his acts of violence because they are sanctified—legitimized—by some form of religious authority.<sup>50</sup> A divine being appears directly involved in determining ends and means or a terrorist’s strategy. This religious stimulus is the inspirational source of most of the terrorist incidents we are experiencing today.<sup>51</sup>

Religious terrorism neither began on 9/11 nor is unique to Islam, having an ancestry arguably stretching back nearly 2,000 years; however, this text will focus on religious terrorism’s more modern and lethal manifestations. We begin our treatment of religious terrorism with an examination of “Islamism,” a set of ideologies holding that Islam is not only a religion but also a political system that emerged as a branch of the Islamic reform movement of the nineteenth century. This movement concluded that its society’s flaws were a result of Islam not presiding over the entire Arab world. Since the 1970s, modern Islamism has become prevalent at once in the Muslim power centers and on the “Muslim street.”<sup>52</sup>

After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Middle East erupted in an orgy of political violence and terrorism that continues to this day. The early terrorists' targets were not American or European citizens; rather, they were Middle Eastern citizens. These terrorist incidents were dramatic, riveting events designed to provide maximum publicity to yet unfamiliar violent Islamist groups:

- The seizure by armed Islamic fundamentalist dissidents of the Al-Masjid al-Haram in Mecca in 1979;
- The assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat by Egyptian Islamic Jihad's (EIJ) Khalid Islambouli on 6 October 1981;
- The 1981 plot to overthrow the government of Bahrain to install an Islamic Republic;
- The attempted assassination of Saddam Hussein of Iraq, 8 July 1982, in Dujail
- The plot to overthrow the Kuwaiti government in 1982;
- A bloody confrontation between the terrorist group al-Gama'a al-Islamiyah and the post-Sadat Egyptian government that concluded with a suicide attack on the Egyptian Embassy in Pakistan by EIJ on 19 November 1995; and
- Islamic uprisings in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria, which all generated considerable news coverage during this tumultuous decade and yet today are forgotten.

Skyjackings of Arab airliners, kidnappings of Arab government officials, assassinations of Arab civil servants, and attacks on Arab businesses and cultural centers became commonplace in the Middle East. Shiite groups like Islamic Amal (Hope) and Hizballah concealing Imad Mugniyah's covert terrorist cell, Islamic Jihad, only began to attract media attention in the early 1980s. Shiites emerged as a new common denominator in terrorism somewhat replacing the Palestinian groups of the "second wave."<sup>53</sup> While this period's growth of religious terrorism is highly complex and is afforded rather indifferent treatment here, certainly the Lebanese civil war contributed significantly as well as other social factors to be addressed below. One point worth noting, as this cycle of international terrorism shifted from one group to another, terrorist attacks became more devastating. As Shiites of both Iran and Lebanon became convinced they had been treated unfairly by the Arab world as well as "colonized" and manipulated by the West, some sought martyrdom through suicide by killing Islamic apostates and western unbelievers.<sup>54</sup> Their anger has spread from the Shiite world of Iran, southern Lebanon, and the marshes of Iraq to the entire Arab world and larger Muslim community. Today, Islam is not the only source of religious terror; however, the vast majority of religious terrorists today are Muslim. This is simple fact, anything else is denial.

Religious terrorism descends from other religious communities as well. One needs only to walk through the mural-covered Catholic neighborhood of Bogside in London Derry where violence between Catholics and Protestants has proven difficult to eradicate to appreciate a Christian contribution to religious terrorism. Arguments are made that "The Troubles," approximately three decades of violence between elements of Northern Ireland's nationalist community (principally Roman Catholic) and unionist community (principally Protestant), represent strictly political terrorism. This is more than slightly disingenuous.

Catholic PIRA terrorists were able to take control of their communities by offering the residents protection from the Protestants and establishing their authority through coercion and torture on their own kith and kin. This particularly unpleasant form of confessional terrorism developed into the hallmark of the PIRA and its splinter groups over the past thirty years.

Kneecapping—torture with a pistol or an electric drill—became a common punishment for nonconformists in the Catholic Republican areas. This punishment was meted out by appointment, which victims kept out of fear for their lives. Depending on the degree of punishment, one or both knees were destroyed. Sometimes elbows and thighs were included and the victim only survived if his family had made a prior arrangement for an ambulance to arrive on the scene at the time of the shooting. The PIRA preferred its Catholic victims to survive, as they then served as an example to others in the community. Protestant extremists also practiced punishment shooting as a means of maintaining discipline and loyalty. Still, the majority of these victims resided in the Catholic communities. Victims rarely cooperated with the British Security Forces and their distinctive plaster casts served as an effective visual deterrent to those who might otherwise have contemplated rejecting the PIRA's stranglehold.

Due to the highly developed skills of Belfast's surgeons, most of those crippled made remarkable recoveries from their traumatic wounds.<sup>55</sup> By way of additional examples of the depths to which this base prejudice descends, a highly skilled and legendary British counterterrorism unit commander once told this writer that he "could smell a Catholic" while Protestant farmers once swore "a Catholic can put the evil eye on your cattle." The third Abrahamic religion, Judaism, also contributes to the annals of religious terrorism and provides some of terrorism's most despicable and destabilizing attacks. On 25 February 1994, that year's Purim Jewish holiday, Dr. Baruch Goldstein, an American-born Jew, entered the mosque in the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron in uniform with IDF rank insignia, creating the image of a reserve officer on active duty. Goldstein opened fire on eight hundred Palestinian worshippers, killing twenty-nine souls and wounding 150. After being subdued by worshippers and disarmed, Goldstein was beaten to death. His blatant act of terrorism in the heart of the most sensitive religious flash point on the West Bank provoked outrage across all communities. Yet, almost immediately, this horrific tragedy took on a distorted life of its own. A bloody atrocity became the source of conspiracy theories arising from all sides. Goldstein allegedly shot "179 Arabs with allegedly 140 bullets," convincing some there must have been other shooters and birthing yet another Middle East conspiracy theory. More nauseating, this cold-blooded Kahanist terrorist was described by his community as a tender person and caring doctor.<sup>56</sup> An inscription on his tomb proclaimed Goldstein "a martyr murdered in sanctifying God's name," and continues, "The holy Dr. Baruch Goldstein . . . gave his soul for the people of Israel." Like his coreligionist Yigal Amir, the assassin of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Goldstein was an archetypal true believer who experienced no ethical conflict killing in the name of God.

Religious terrorism blossoms from nearly all denominations if fortified with the necessary conditions such as the following:

- Today's ethnic-religious conflicts in places like Iraq, Kashmir, Palestine, and Sri Lanka;
- The impact triggered by the modern globalization of western values, economics, and popular culture, and by the extent to which the West, particularly America, captures the imagination particularly of Middle Eastern intellectuals and youths;<sup>57</sup>
- A lack of democratic legitimacy, especially in the Middle East. Sadly, while Latin America, eastern Europe, and Southeast Asia are gradually developing democratic institutions, the one region that has seen little increase in representative institutions over the past forty years, is the Middle East. With the exception of Israel, Freedom House does not list one Middle Eastern nation as "free";<sup>58</sup> and

- Political repression; economic inequality, and social upheaval, which foster a self-loathing, especially a result of exposure to the malaise of the Arab world.

Yet an inner logic exists that stimulates religious terrorism that we ignore at our peril. Today's religious terrorists, especially the Salafi-Jihadi variant, perceive a sense of crisis threatening their Muslim identity and consequently, their very survival. As a result, these terrorists use religion as a refuge from which centuries-old concepts such as the reestablishment of the Islamic caliphate become modern goals. Their religion is also employed as a physical or spiritual sanctuary against repression as was strikingly demonstrated during the Egyptian trials of the al-Gama'a al-Islamiyah in the 1980s.<sup>59</sup> Religion is exploited as an instrument for activism or political action, which can be frequently seen in various Friday sermons originating in the Middle East.<sup>60</sup> As a result of this religious sanctioning, terrorists maintain that their actions are purely defensive and reactive to the threat from secularization commencing with foreign influences; from modernizing contacts within their own culture; and in some cases within resistance movements themselves. The current bloody struggle between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas on the West Bank and in Gaza for the leadership of the Palestinian people is an unequivocal example.<sup>61</sup> This inner logic also motivates the evolving threat from al Qaeda.

While al Qaeda and its Salafi-Jihadist enterprise continued to lose ground, both structurally and before the court of world public opinion, they remain the most dangerous form of religious terrorism today.<sup>62</sup> Al Qaeda, once a model business organization with a multimillion dollar operating budget, has transformed into a hybrid model—a mix of centralized command and control emanating from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and global decentralization in which affiliated organizations have a great deal of autonomy. While al Qaeda's goal—uniting Muslims to overthrow apostate regimes and expelling westerners from Muslim countries—remains unaffected, its methodologies have transformed from an organization that planned and executed attacks to a more nebulous movement aimed at inciting global acts of terrorism. Arguably, the best description of al Qaeda today posits two variants: one nested along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and being remnants of al Qaeda of the 1980s, and the other, the promoter of al Qaeda-ism. This terrorist ideology facilitates interaction and support of like-minded Islamic mercenaries in an international matrix of logistical, financial, and sometimes operational terrorist activity.<sup>63</sup> Practitioners of al Qaeda-ism, an ideology that has bonded together today more than a hundred Sunni affiliates or affinity groups such as al-Ittihad in Kenya and Somalia, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Abu Sayyaf Group in Philippines, or al Qaeda in the Land of Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM) practice a radical Salafi-Jihadi Islam, which actually predates the original movement.<sup>64</sup>

A classic affinity group, AQLIM, named for their location in North Africa, evolved from the Algerian militant group, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). GSPC formed in 1996 as an outgrowth of the once-powerful and extremely violent Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA). GIA's popularity plummeted following a series of massacres in which it killed thousands of Algerian civilians, opening the door into the region for the al Qaeda-supported GSPC, which effectively eclipsed the GIA by 1998. Imitation of al Qaeda-ism is also the part of the process of self-radicalization during which individuals reconstruct their worldviews and create new identities linking them to other amoeba-like Salafi-Jihadist groups.

Al Qaeda and its affinity groups can be viewed as a network, a collection of nodes connected through links. Some nodes are more popular and are attached to more links, connecting them to other more isolated nodes. These more connected nodes, called "hubs," are

important components of bin Laden's international Salafi-Jihadist network. Prior to 9/11, a few highly connected hubs dominated bin Laden's spiderweb. Marc Sageman captured this organization perfectly in *Understanding Terror Networks*: a central staff, core Arabs, Maghreb Arabs, and Muslims from Southeast Asia, which were large clusters built around hubs: Osama bin Laden, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Zein al-Abidin Mohammed Hussein, and Abu Bakar Baasyir. The central staff were connected to their major clusters by lieutenants in the field: Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Waleed Mohammed Tawfiq bin Attash, and Abd al-Rahim al-Bashiri for the Core Arabs; Fateh Kamel and Amar Makhulif for the Maghreb Arabs; and Riduan Isamuddin and Ali Ghufrom for the Southeast Asians.<sup>65</sup> Bin Laden's genius lay in tolerating this network's spontaneous and natural evolution, without interference and guided through his "leader's intent."<sup>66</sup> His networks to this day are not static; they evolve over time. Al Qaeda network growth is not a random process; rather, it is one of preferential attachment. Sageman humorously describes in lecture this networking occurring over dietary preferences and meal preparation in the Afghan camps of the 1990s: Arabs preparing kebab; Maghrebis preferring couscous; and, Southeast Asian terrorists gathered around curries. While amusing, Sageman's hypothesis is more than plausible. In Afghan camps run by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence in the 1980s, this author observed Tajiks eating with Tajiks, Pashtuns eating with their fellow tribesmen, and Shiite Hazara, considered kafir [infidels] by their Sunni coreligionist Afghans, eating alone.

These networks resist fragmentation because of their dense interconnectivity making random attacks rarely effective. Hubs are vulnerable, but must be attacked simultaneously: five to fifteen hubs at once. The price of al Qaeda's robustness is susceptibility that can be observed in the numerous successful drone attacks along the Afghan-Pakistan border today. Al Qaeda sustains casualties; however, there is no knockout punch possible. A more traditional and vulnerable hierarchical network like Jemaah Islamiyah, organized top-down versus bottom-up, broke up when the Indonesian government decided to act after the Bali bombings.

How should we portray the evolving threat from al Qaeda and its Salafi-Jihadist enterprise? Clearly, there is no facile answer. Governments must develop their counterterrorism strategies to deal with competing, contradictory evidence; address multiple timeline horizons that deal with the present as well as the next generation; and eventually grapple with the very notion of what constitutes "victory" over this threat. Complicated subjects like how to suppress al Qaeda are rarely black and white, and this is no exception.<sup>67</sup> Al Qaeda and its enterprise capture the lion's share of media headlines and national security focus; however, we need to examine another terrorist manifestation that arguably is just as lethal.

### ***Fringe Element Terrorism***

Unlike the political and religious radicals who purportedly seek to transform society, fringe elements or "wacko-perps" have narrowly defined issues around which they are mobilized.<sup>68</sup> It is only their choice of terrorism, not the inherent threat posed by their views, that leads them to be accurately perceived as a threat to society. American terrorist Timothy McVeigh imagined the US government was trampling rather than protecting his individual rights when he detonated a truck bomb in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 fellow citizens and injuring more than eight hundred on 19 April 1995.<sup>69</sup> This date was the second anniversary of a standoff between FBI agents and Branch Davidians, which ended in a fire that destroyed their compound located near Waco, Texas, killing at least 74 people.<sup>70</sup> The Oklahoma attack also occurred on the 220<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the American revolutionary battles

Lexington and Concord against British domination. McVeigh's date selection manifested his visceral hate of government.

A similar "wacko-perp" previously mentioned was Theodore Kaczynski, known as the "Unabomber," an American MIT graduate with a Ph.D. in mathematics whose neo-Luddite views led him to carry out a campaign of terrorist mail bombings across the United States from 1978 to 1995. Kaczynski sent sixteen bombs to targets including universities and airlines, killing three people and injuring twenty-three because he considered technology a dehumanizing force that was incompatible with his personal freedom.<sup>71</sup> Kaczynski was finally captured, found guilty, and diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic. While his grievances were in essence nonviolent, his manner of protest was lethal.

Some of these bizarre causes attract a following. Members of an Oregon-based group of eco-terrorists who called themselves "the family" were indicted in January 2006 for various acts of destruction across the western United States. The federal indictment detailed a story of four and a half years of vandalism and fire bombings on seventeen sites in California, Colorado, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming. US Attorney General Alberto Gonzales noted, "In all, their trail of destruction across the Pacific Northwest and beyond resulted in millions of dollars of property damage."<sup>72</sup>

However, the most lethal "wacko-perps" to date were Japanese. The Aum Shinrikyo cult, which has been renamed Aleph, represented the most lethal manifestation of a New Age apocalyptic religious sect.<sup>73</sup> Aum combined tenets from Buddhism, Hinduism, and Christianity and was obsessed with the apocalypse.<sup>74</sup> Shoko Asahara, Aum's founder and self-proclaimed "enlightened one," motivated his devotees to engage in bizarre rituals such as drinking his blood and wearing electrical caps that they believed kept their brain waves in tune with his brain. The group made headlines around the world when, on 20 March 1995, its members carried out a chemical attack in the Tokyo subway system. A nerve agent, sarin, was released in train cars, killing twelve and causing an estimated six thousand people to seek medical attention.<sup>75</sup>

While at first blush, we would immediately characterize Aum's followers as "wackoperps," their organization and extent dictate our attention. At the time of the 1995 subway attack, the group claimed forty thousand members worldwide, with offices in the United States, Russia, and Japan, according to the State Department.<sup>76</sup> They conducted experiments with sarin, VX, anthrax, botulism, and crude radioactive dispersal devices (RDD). At the time of the Japanese police's much-overdue crackdown, Aum had accumulated as much as \$1.2 billion in assets; purchased molecular engineering computer software; and attempted to recruit Volgograd weapons experts. Official reports from the US and Japanese governments and interviews with law enforcement agencies and intelligence officers conclude that the group staged at least twenty attacks between 1990 and 1995: ten with chemical agents and ten with biological ones.<sup>77</sup> For its terrorist attacks, the Japanese courts uncharacteristically have sentenced fourteen members to hang. Russian officials also arrested several Aum followers in 2001 for planning to bomb the Imperial Palace in Japan as part of an elaborate attempt to free Asahara.<sup>78</sup> Aum Shinrikyo has the distinction of being considered the first nonstate terrorist group to attempt to employ a modern weapon of mass destruction, and their activities benchmark the beginning of postmodern terrorism.

When you attempt to estimate who is most likely to use a weapon of mass destruction, the two groups that may experience fewer moral constraints are religious fundamentalist organizations and religious cults or closed cults sometimes erroneously called new religions.<sup>79</sup> Today, three requirements exist for a terrorist's use of weapons of mass destruction: the ability to

acquire a weapon; the capability to disseminate a weapon; and the desire to use one. We are witnessing the confluence of these conditions, and, regrettably, all three conditions exist today.<sup>80</sup> The means and predisposition for a covert or a clandestine operation aimed at creating immense destruction are spreading. A clandestine nuclear attack is one such possible conjunction. Nuclear weapons technology is oozing out of control. Nuclear materials are spreading into hands hostile or potentially hostile to democratic states and into regions where the prospects for effective control to prevent loss and stem the continued spread are highly uncertain. A successful clandestine nuclear attack would have significance extending far beyond the immense immediate casualties.<sup>81</sup> We are in the midst of a potentially dramatic change in our current concept of national security. Once our nations were essentially secure from homeland destruction, unless our military was defeated. That may have changed:

For would-be aggressors before 1945, a capacity to destroy always required a prior capacity to win. Without a victory, their intended aggressions were never more than military intentions. This is no longer the case. From the standpoint of ensuring any one state's national survival, the goal of preventing a classical military defeat has become secondary. The implications of this transforming development are considerable.<sup>82</sup>

Terrorist groups, non-state actors, can circumvent armies and deliver a catastrophic strike. Groups such as Avenging Israel's Blood, which sought revenge for the victims of the Holocaust in 1946, to Aum Shinrikyo in 1995, and now al Qaeda, with its stated intent to use weapons of mass destruction, reinforce the notion that we should not be musing whether we are going to be struck, but rather when such an attack will occur again. If we have failed to absorb the lesson to expect the unexpected, then we are losing ground, not gaining ground in this war on terrorism.

### ***In Search of "Root Causes" of Terrorism***

The question that should be foremost at this point is what causes a human to strike out at fellow humans using terrorist methods. Thus far, we have scrutinized the nature of terrorism, but what about its root causes? Visualize a beautiful oriental carpet that I will use to introduce the tapestry of terrorism. A carpet is traditionally woven on a loom, a familiar weaving apparatus. The carpet's warp, the threads running the length of the piece, and its woof, the threads running crosswise or at right angles to the warp of the piece, provide the lattice for the carpet's knots, which create the design. These threads are the plinth of a carpet and, building upon our analogy, symbolize the essential root causes of today's more deadly forms of modern terrorism. The warp is the atavistic adrenalin rush, the associated physiological euphoric state that accompanies a terrorist's action. This is not unlike the euphoric state one experiences in combat, in a situation of extreme anxiety, or simply skydiving. Killing another human being—the ability to take life—produces intense excitement, elevating a human to nearly godlike powers.<sup>83</sup> The chief of Jaish-e-Mohammed, Maulana Masood Azahar, described caressing a Kalashnikov in his hands as being “. . . ready to talk to the enemy. The bullet was in the chamber and it was ready to fire and I felt ecstatic.”<sup>84</sup> Committing murder becomes a thrilling decision: a peak experience; an elevation from meaninglessness to real consequence; and the chance to be a hero.<sup>85</sup> To further our analogy, the woof simply reinforces the warp because killing in the name of a divine being allows cold-blooded murder to be morally justifiable; sometimes required; and celestially rewarded. The gravitas of religious authenticity legitimizes an act of primordial murder.

Now we apply the knots to our piece, which represent the variety of preconditions, factors that set the stage for terrorism over the long run and precipitants, specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism, to borrow the terminology of Dr. Martha Crenshaw.<sup>86</sup> “Root causes” are not the proximate cause of terrorism. Rather, they are factors that establish an environment in which terrorism may arise. A basic distinction exists between root-cause factors that are preconditions and those that are precipitant. The former set the stage and the latter ignite the action. These preconditions and precipitants—our knots—describe: dreadful histories accompanied by humiliation; foreign repression; the love for a lost land or era; the lack of democracy, civil liberties, and rule of law; the lack of power sharing, ethnic or religious discrimination; illegitimate governance; a government’s intolerance of minorities; extremist ideologies or zealotry; becoming a failed state; rapid modernization; or charismatic leaders, individuals who can whip a mob into frenzy by the power of their oratory or deeds and then set the mob loose to destroy. Two examples of the power of oratory are the Muslim Brotherhood’s incitement causing the near destruction of Cairo in 26 January 1952 and the destruction of the US Embassy in Islamabad in 1979 by a mob goaded to believe a fatally erroneous Friday sermon stating America had bombed the al-Masjid al-Haram in Mecca. The Hebron Massacre mentioned earlier was a knot as was the start of the 28 September 2000 riots and injuries soon after Ariel Sharon’s untimely visit to the Temple Mount, an area known to Muslims as al-Haram as-Sharif. An additional knot unique to the Middle East is what Christopher Dobson described in Black September as “a fatal flaw” or the Palestinian “disease,” which has been woven through Palestinian history like a scarlet thread. Supporting this cultural propensity to violence, Ghazi Hamad, a member of Hamas who acted as the spokesman for the Hamas-led government in Gaza rhetorically queried in a sharply worded article, published in the widely read Palestinian newspaper al-Ayyam, “Has violence become a culture implanted in our bodies and our flesh?”<sup>87</sup>

Certain factors sustain a climate of terrorism, such as: cycles of revenge observed constantly in Chechnya fueled by adat; the need for a group to provide for its members or simply survive, as the remnants of the PIRA are discovering today; the discovery of profitable criminal activities as with the FARC’s monopoly of the cocaine trade in Colombia; the perception that there are no exits given the bloodshed of the conflict; or, as Somalia’s piracy reminds us once again, ungoverned spaces, failed or failing states. These factors provide a conducive medium for terrorism’s root causes to ferment. Shortcomings exist in our current knowledge base on root causes. As context matters, data analysis argues for an interdisciplinary systems approach and access to classified or otherwise restricted material in order for us to recognize factors contributing to a terrorism-spawning environment. The issues of the Taliban in Pakistan are simply not very comparable to those of the PIRA or to those of Hezbollah and Hamas in Lebanon and the occupied Palestinian territories, or even the current terrorism in Baghdad.<sup>88</sup>

Myths imply that terrorism is the inevitable by-product of poverty. However, as Richard Minter reminds us in *Losing Bin Laden*, terrorism is the derivative of individual spiritual poverty, but not mass material poverty.<sup>89</sup> Another myth suggests that terrorism is the result of hostility over the American involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, or the global war on terrorism. Many argue that terrorism would disappear if only the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were resolved. This too is sadly a myth. Some self-absorbed observers suggest that terrorism is encouraged in response to the world’s efforts to prevent terrorism. This is merely a political fig leaf that hides wanting capability, or worse, cowardice. These spurious conceptions are regrettably left frequently unchallenged at terrorism conferences and United Nations gatherings. One concluding

caution about those who sometimes endorse research to discover the elusive root cause of terrorism: frequently, this is a subterfuge to excuse the inexcusable.

### ***Conclusion: Or, Just the Beginning?***

Why have we not been able to bring education to our children on our own? Fathers and parents, I implore you to dedicate your full effort and commitment to see that all your children are educated. Otherwise, they will merely graze like sheep in the field, at the mercy of nature and the world changing so terrifyingly around us.

*Syed Abbas, Supreme Leader of Northern Pakistan's Shia, from Three Cups of Tea*

Terrorism, like disease, is a perennial, ceaseless struggle we will never completely eradicate but must constantly treat. Like skin cancer, we must discover it; surgically incise it; conduct biopsy to determine its causes and malignancy; and scrutinize it constantly. The following chapters in this text will detail some of the necessary policies and strategies to “treat” terrorism. In addition to these prescient recommendations, consider policies that tackle just three issues. A group of thirty Arab intellectuals published the Arab Human Development Report 2002 contained in the annual United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report. Rima Khalaf Hunaidi, a former deputy prime minister of Jordan, and her team indentified three deficits within the region: knowledge, freedom, and womanpower.<sup>90</sup> Substantially reducing these three deficits will remove many “knots” from our terrorism tapestry.

Knowledge permits individuals to make informed decisions regarding the intellectual poverty of terrorism and not be led as like sheep as the prescient Syed Abbas warned. Al Qaeda and its Salafi-Jihadist enterprise are crystal clear about what they oppose, yet they have made no argument to prove they could offer a better tomorrow. Next, countries with established political freedom have been empirically proven to be less prone to terrorism.<sup>91</sup> The Middle East models all the outward trappings of democracy. Elections are held and human-rights conventions are signed. Yet the great wave of democratization that has opened up so much of the world over the past twenty years seems to have left the Muslim world virtually untouched. Finally, no nation can improve its economic circumstances while disenfranchising over 50 percent of its population. One of every two Arab women still can neither read nor write. Female participation in their country's political and economic life is the lowest in the world. The diehard, self-righteous obscurantists of the Islamic world ensure its deepening malaise as female oppression in Islamic countries is manifestly getting worse.<sup>92</sup> Terrorism is not likely to disappear, but its appeal could lessen if these three deficits are narrowed, enhancing economic growth in the Middle East and reducing its attendant youth unemployment.<sup>93</sup>

Our adversaries in the long war on terrorism are dispersed around the globe. Al Qaeda and its Salafi-Jihadist enterprise are resilient, patient, ruthless, and dedicated to the mass murder of innocents. Ironically, the very democratic nature of our societies renders our citizens vulnerable. To ensure the continuation of our democratic blessings, we must create a zero-tolerance attitude toward terrorism and collectively defend ourselves. Beyond al Qaeda, we confront a protracted ideological conflict, of which the terrorist campaign waged by disconnected Salafi-Jihadists, is merely a symptom.<sup>94</sup> Violent terrorists will always be with us, so we must be capable and motivated to suppress and, when necessary, kill these individuals whose galvanizing dream is to destroy the West and those who emulate free ways of life, through the

wonton murder of innocent civilians. When hatred is bred in the enemy's bone, the notion of exercising strategic patience will likely earn us a rest for all eternity. This book may illuminate a more prudent way ahead.

---

*Professor Andrew Nichols Pratt Since August 1996, Professor Pratt has been the Professor of Strategy and International Politics in the College of International Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, he developed the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS) and was named its first Director. In February 2008, he served the US Special Envoy for Middle East Regional Security (SEMERS) in Jerusalem and on the West Bank. He reassumed the duties of Director, PTSS in October 2009. Prior to his retirement from the Marine Corps after twenty-six years, Colonel Pratt served as director of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the Marine War College. Throughout his career, he was privileged to command extensively and at every level, from a CIA Special Operations Group team that conducted covert operations in denied areas in support of US national security objectives overseas, to a Battalion Landing Team deployed in the Persian Gulf. A. N. Pratt graduated from the US Naval Academy and holds two Master of Arts degrees. His involvement with counterterrorism matters began in 1967 and continues apace.*

### **Recommended Readings**

Al Zawahiri, Ayman. In His Own Words: A Translation of the Writings of Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri. Ed. and trans. Laura Mansfield. US: TLG Publications, 2006.

Cetron, Marvin J., and Probst, Peter S. Terror 2000: The Future Face of Terrorism. No publ. Initially printed as "For Government Use Only, Not for Public Release," 24 June 1994. Available at: <http://www.dtic.mil/srch/doc?collection=t3&id=ADB201036>

O'Neill, Bard E. Insurgency and Terrorism; From Revolution to Apocalypse, 2nd ed. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005.

Open Source Center. OpenSource.gov provides timely and tailored translations, reporting, and analysis on foreign policy and national security issues from the Open Source Center and its partners, <https://www.opensource.gov>

Poland, James M. Understanding Terrorism, 2nd ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 2005.

Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terrorist Networks. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.

Stout, Mark E., Jessica M. Huckabey, John R. Schindler, and Jim Lacey. The Terrorist Perspectives

Project; Strategic and Operational Views of Al Qaida and Associated Movements. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008.

## Notes

1. William J. Casey, "The International Linkages; What Do We Know?" *Hydra of Carnage: International Linkages of Terrorism: The Witnesses Speak*, Edited by Uri Ra'anan and others (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986), 5–15.
2. Jackie Craven, "The New York World Trade Center," About.com. Retrieved 24 August 2009, from <http://architecture.about.com/od/worldtradecenter/ss/worldtrade.htm>
3. "Official 9/11 Death Toll Climbs By One," CBS News, 10 July 2008. Retrieved 13 October 2009, from <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/07/10/national/main4250100.shtml>
4. Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, "Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat," New York Police Department, 2007. Retrieved on 5 September 2009 from [http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths\\_blog/files/NYPD\\_Report-Radicalization\\_in\\_the\\_West.pdf](http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/files/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf). Their report uses the term "unremarkable" thirteen times in describing individual perpetrators within today's Jihadi-Salafi terrorist movement.
5. For more on this Islamist commitment to political activism and the legitimization of violence, see Dr. Patrick Sookhdeo's treatment of the subject in "How to Undermine the Extremist Ideology Behind Al Qaeda" contained in this text.
6. "Blair Warns of WMD Terror Threat," CNN.com, 5 March 2004. Retrieved on 5 September 2009 from <http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/03/05/uk.blair/index.htm>. According to Blair, the nature of the "global threat we face in Britain and round the world is real and existential and it is the task of leadership to expose it and fight it, whatever the political cost."
7. Brian Michael Jenkins, *Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), 8.
8. Christopher C. Harmon, "What History Suggests About Terrorism and Its Future," in *The Past As Prologue*, ed. Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 218.
9. Elaine Sciolino, "Teacher in Hiding After Attack on Islam Stirs Threats," *New York Times*, 30 September 2006. Retrieved 15 October 2009 from <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/30/world/europe/30france.html>
10. Thomas Harding and George Jones, "Blair links Iran to brutal act of terror," *Telegraph.co.uk*, 6 Apr 2007. Retrieved 15 October 2009 from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1547852/Blair-links-Iran-to-brutal-act-of-terror.html>
11. "Stoning victim 'begged for mercy'," *BBC News*, 4 November 2008. Retrieved 24 August 2009, from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7708169.stm>
12. Jessica Stern, *The Ultimate Terrorists* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 11–30 and 164–168.
13. *Terrorism Act 2000*, Office of Public Sector Information (OPSI). Retrieved 13 October 2009 [http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga\\_20000011\\_en\\_2#pt1](http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000011_en_2#pt1)
14. "Security Council Committee established pursuant to UNSR 1267 (1999) concerning Al Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities," UN.org. Retrieved 5 September 2009 from <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/index.shtml>
15. Simon Saradzhyan, "Kremlin Goes on a Western Offensive" *Moscow Times*, 27 September 2004. Retrieved 24 August 2009, from <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/8382-3.cfm>
16. Boaz Ganor, "Proposing a Definition of Terrorism" *Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?* International Institute for Counter-Terrorism.

Retrieved 24 August 2009, from <http://www.ict.org.il/ResearchPublications/tabid/64/Articlsid/432/currentpage/1/Default.aspx>

17. Dr. Christopher Bassford, in a teaching note written on 3 January 2003, suggested Clausewitz's trinity comprises three specific elements. The identity of those elements is readily evident to anyone who reads the first paragraph of his description: It is "composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason. . . ." This set of elements is usually labeled "emotion/chance/reason"; sometimes "violence/chance and probability/rational calculation"; or, even more abstractly, "irrationality/non rationality/rationality."

18. Ganor, "Proposing a Definition of Terrorism."

19. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 1 a: silly idle talk: drivel b: something insignificant or worthless: nonsense from <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/twaddle>

20. Rolf Ekeus, "New Challenges for the United Nations," in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, ed. Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), 517–528.

21. John Dugard, "International Terrorism and the Just War," from David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander, eds., *The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 83–85.

22. Louis Rene Beres, "On the Difference Between Murderers and Freedom Fighters," Freeman Center for Strategic Studies, 29 January 2004. Retrieved 24 August 2009, from [http://www.freeman.org/m\\_online/feb04/beres.htm](http://www.freeman.org/m_online/feb04/beres.htm).

23. Richard B. Frank, "The Best Worst Option," from "Would You Have Dropped the Bomb?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (July/August 2005), 60. Frank, winner of the 2000 Harry S. Truman Book award for *Downfall: The End of the Japanese Imperial Empire*, argues that a sober assessment of US strategy demonstrates the atomic bombs were the worst way to end the Pacific War except all the others. The grim reality is that no other combination of events would have produced an enduring peace at less cost.

24. Stephen Robinson, "Bombed US Warship Was Defended by Sailors with Unloaded Guns," *Telegraph.co.uk*, 15 November 2000. Retrieved 24 August 24, 2009, from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/1374316/Bombed-US-warship-was-defended-bysailors-with-unloaded-guns.html>

25. John Gearson, "The Nature of Modern Terrorism," in *Superterrorism: Policy Responses*, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford, UK: The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd./Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 14.

26. Philip K. Hitti, "The Assassins," Retrieved 15 October 2009 from [http://www.alamut.com/subj/ideologies/alamut/hitti\\_Ass.html](http://www.alamut.com/subj/ideologies/alamut/hitti_Ass.html)

27. Bernard Lewis, "The Ismalites and the Assassins," in *A History of the Crusades: The First Hundred Years*, ed. Kenneth M. Setton and Marshall W. Baldwin, 2nd ed. (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 130.

28. Walter Laqueur, *A History of Terrorism* (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers 2001), 12.

29. Walter Laqueur, "A History of Terrorism" in *Confronting Fear: A History of Terrorism*, ed. Isaac Cronin (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 2002), 6.

30. Laqueur, 6.

31. Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 18

32. Richard Bach Jensen, "The International Campaign Against Anarchist Terrorism, 1880-1930s," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (January 2009): 89–109.
33. Reiss, Tom. *The Orientalist: Solving the Mystery of a Strange and a Dangerous Life* (New York: Random House, 2005). Retrieved 15 October 2009, from <http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/samples/random051/2004050928.html>
34. Sean Kendall Anderson and Stephen Sloan, *Assassins to Zealots*, 2nd ed. (Lanhan, MD: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2002), 3–5. This is an excellent text to keep on hand as it contains a wealth of information regarding major terrorist groups, significant terrorist events, and terrorists' weapons systems of choice.
35. Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, 2nd ed., Revised (Paperback) (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books Inc, June, 2005), 29.
36. Stephanie Hanson, "Colombia's Right-Wing Paramilitaries and Splinter Groups," Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, 11 January 2008. Retrieved 24 August 2009, from [http://www.cfr.org/publication/15239/colombias\\_rightwing\\_paramilitaries\\_and\\_splinter\\_groups.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/15239/colombias_rightwing_paramilitaries_and_splinter_groups.html)
37. For granularity on terror and the American Revolution, see: John J. Tierney, "Terror at Home: The American Revolution and Irregular Warfare," *Stanford Journal of International Studies*, No. 12 (Spring 1977): 1–19. Note, however, there is no evidence that statesmen or senior army commanders of the American Revolutionaries endorsed terrorism or allowed it as calculated policy or strategy.
38. Lon Savage, *Thunder in the Mountains: The West Virginia Mine War, 1920–21* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, September 1990). The West Virginia mine war of 1920–21, a major civil insurrection of unusual brutality on both sides, even by the standards of the coal fields, involved thousands of union and nonunion miners, state and private police, militia, and federal troops. Before it was over, three West Virginia counties were in open rebellion, much of the state was under military rule, and bombers of the US Army Air Corps had been dispatched against striking miners.
39. Greg Miller, "Right-Wing Extremists Seen as a Threat," *Los Angeles Times*, 16 April 2009. Retrieved on 24 August 2009, from <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/16/nation/na-rightwing-extremists16>
40. "Germany's Far-Right Rolls Up Its Sleeves," *Deutsche Welle*, 17 October 2006. Retrieved on 24 August 2009 from <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,2206348,00.html>
41. Sean Gannon, "IRA-PLO Cooperation: A Long, Cozy Relationship," *The Jerusalem Post*, 7 April 2009. Retrieved on 24 August 2009, from <http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1238562940033&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FPrinter>
42. Duane "Dewy" R. Clarridge, *A Spy for all Seasons: My Life in the CIA* (New York: Scribner, 1997); cited in Michael Ledeen, "Dead Terrorist in Baghdad," *National Review Online*, 20 August 2002. Retrieved on 24 August 2009, from <http://www.nationalreview.com/ledeen/ledeen082002.asp>
43. Margaret Thatcher, Speech to American Bar Association, 15 July 1985. Retrieved on 24 August 2009, from <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=106096>
44. "Bombs for Croatia" *TIME*, 20 September 1976. Retrieved on 24 August 2009, from <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,946611-1,00.html>
45. James M. Poland, *Understanding Terrorism: Groups, Strategies and Responses*, 1st ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1988), 45.

46. Brigitte Lebens Nacos, *Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, Inc. 2002), 12.
47. Michael Stohl, "Demystifying Terrorism: The Myths and Realities of Contemporary Political Terrorism," in M. Stohl (ed.), *The Politics of Terrorism*, 3rd ed. (New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1988), 11.
48. Dr. Jerrold Post, "Rogue Leader Profiles," Political Psychology Associates, Ltd. Retrieved on 24 August 2009 from <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-conf2000/post/sld001.htm>, slide #13.
49. Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 1955; Reprinted 2006), 64.
50. Dr. Jerrold Post, "The Mind of the Terrorist: When Hatred Is Bred in the Bone," Lecture, George Washington University, April 2008, Slide #32.
51. Dr. Tom Mockaitis, a PTSS lecturer, argues there could be a mistake in attributing the increased lethality of terrorist attacks today to lack of restraint brought on by religious extremism. Instead, the explanation may be that today's terrorists emphasize high body count due to a "threshold phenomenon." Numbed by decades of violence, people do not shock as easily as they once did. Mockaitis suggests today four- or five-digit casualties like September 11 are needed to produce the same effect once caused by a relative handful of murders. See Thomas R. Mockaitis, *The "New" Terrorism: Myths and Reality* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007) at [http://books.google.com/books?id=wGanuKh80WsC&dq=The+%E2%80%9CNew%E2%80%9D+Terrorism+by+Thomas+R.+Mockaitis.&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=I3e8Y3Z9Lx&sig=9fGaLXyJNEcJY6EVbkbicJFIVok&hl=en&ei=xOQ4SrH9GsLJ\\_gaqu4TXDQ&sa=X&oi=book\\_result&ct=result&resnum=1#PPR1,M1](http://books.google.com/books?id=wGanuKh80WsC&dq=The+%E2%80%9CNew%E2%80%9D+Terrorism+by+Thomas+R.+Mockaitis.&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=I3e8Y3Z9Lx&sig=9fGaLXyJNEcJY6EVbkbicJFIVok&hl=en&ei=xOQ4SrH9GsLJ_gaqu4TXDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1#PPR1,M1)
52. Patrick Sookhdeo, "How to Undermine the Extremist Ideology Behind Al Qaeda," herein.
53. David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," in *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of Grand Strategy*, ed. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 46–73.
54. Apostasy in Islam is commonly defined as the rejection in word or deed of Islam by a person who was previously a Muslim. "Apostate regimes" are leading avowed targets of Islamist terrorists.
55. Major Alexander C. Roy, Royal Marines, United Kingdom, *The Roots of Terrorism in Northern Ireland* (United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 1991). Retrieved on 24 August 2009, from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1991/RAC.htm>
56. The central claim of Kahanism argues the vast majority of the Arabs of Israel are, and will continue to be, enemies of Jews, and that a Jewish theocratic state, governed by Halakha, cleansed by the forced expulsion of Palestinians, from Israel, the West Bank, Gaza Strip, areas of modern-day Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and even Iraq-Eretz Yisrael, should be created. Kahanism is also associated with support for violence against Jewish opponents and against the Arab population generally. For a useful overview, see Raphael Cohen-Almagor, "Vigilant Jewish Fundamentalism: From the JDL to Kach," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 1992): 44–66.
57. Meyrav Wurmser, "The Roots of Islamic Radicalism," Hudson Institute, 1 September 2001. Retrieved on 25 August 2009, from [https://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication\\_details&id=1084](https://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=1084)

58. "Map of Freedom 2008," including Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Israeli Occupied Territories [Israel], Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian Authority-Administered Territories [Israel], Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Western Sahara [Morocco], and Yemen, Freedom House, 2008. Retrieved on 24 August 2009, from

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=7534&year=2008>.

59. Magnus Ranstorp, "Terrorism in the Name of Religion," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 50 (Summer 1996): 47.

60. The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) archives hundreds of these sermons: see "Palestinian Friday Sermon by Sheik Ibrahim Mudeiris: Muslims Will Rule America and Britain, Jews Are a Virus Resembling AIDS," Palestinian Authority TV-13 May 2005, MEMRI clip no. 669. Retrieved 5 September 2009 from <http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/669.htm>

61. For a thorough treatment of this struggle see Jonathan Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

62. US Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2008*, "Chapter 1: Strategic Assessment," 30 April 2009. Retrieved on 24 August 2009, from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2008/122411.htm>; and "Al Qaeda Network Still CIA's Top Priority," *Middle East Online*, 19 May 2009, retrieved 5 September 2009 from <http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=32123>. DCI Leon Panetta noted "defeating Al Qaeda remained the CIA top priority as it "remains the most serious security threat we face."

63. For example, terrorists in North Africa threatened to execute a British hostage unless the UK released radical preacher Abu Qatada from jail. The unidentified hostage was captured earlier in 2009 in a remote region on the Mali-Niger border where he was attending a cultural festival as a tourist. The Foreign Office confirmed the threat issued by a group known as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. The group threatened to kill the British hostage within twenty days—a deadline that expired on 16 May 2009—and the hostage was murdered.

64. Eben Kaplan, "The Rise of Al Qaedaism," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 18 July 2007, Retrieved on 25 August 2009, from [http://www.cfr.org/publication/11033/rise\\_of\\_alqaedaism.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/11033/rise_of_alqaedaism.html)

65. Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 137–138.

66. Leader's intent can be defined as the purpose of a chosen action or direction so subordinates have a clear understanding of the desired end state of an assignment. Clear and concise, the leader's intent includes a mission's overall purpose and expected results. With clearly communicated purpose and direction, all can understand what they must do and why. Leader's intent consists of three parts: Task: What it is to be done, or the "objectives"; Purpose: Why it is to be done, or "sense-making"; and, End State: What it should look like when done, or "the goal."

67. Russell E. Travers, "Evaluating Progress in the War on Terror," *The Intelligencer, Journal of US Intelligence Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Winter/Spring, 2009): 11–14.

68. "Wacko-perp" is an FBI term that combines the slang term "wacko" meaning crazy and "perp," a law enforcement agency (LEA) abbreviation for perpetrator. "Wacko-perps" describes an organization of like-minded criminals.

69. "A Look at the Numbers," *Oklahoma City National Memorial & Museum*. Retrieved on 5 September 2009 from <http://www.oklahomacitynationalmemorial.org/secondary.php?section=5&catid=145>

70. Justin Sturken and Mary Dore, "Remembering the Waco Siege," ABC News.com, 29 February 2007. Retrieved on 5 September 2009 from <http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=2908955&page=1>
71. "The Unabomber's Brother Tells His Story," NPR, 30 May 2009. Retrieved on 5 September 2009 from <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104743973>
72. Alicia Caldwell, "11 Indicted in Eco-Terror Investigation," Denver Post, 20 January 2006. Retrieved on 25 August 2009, from [http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci\\_3421918](http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_3421918)
73. Jonathan B. Tucker, "Lessons from the Case Studies" in *Toxic Terror, Assessing Terrorist use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*, ed. Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2000), 251.
74. "In the Spotlight: Aum Shinrikyo," Center for Defense Information, 23 July 2002. Retrieved on 5 September 2009 from <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/aumshinrikyo.cfm>
75. US Department of State, "Country Reports on Terrorism 2007," 30 April 2008. Retrieved on 5 September 2009 from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103714.htm>
76. Ibid.
77. David E. Kaplan, "Aum Shinrikyo, 1995," in Tucker, ed., *Toxic Terror*, 207.
78. US Department of State, "Country Reports on Terrorism 2007."
79. Dr. Jerrold Post, "Psychological and Motivational Factors in Terrorist Decision-Making: Implications for CBW Terrorism," in Tucker, ed., *Toxic Terror*, 288.
80. Dr. Peter Katona's first lecture to Program on Terrorism and Security Studies on 20 June 2006 (PTSS 06-5).
81. Noah Feldman, "Islam, Terror and the Second Nuclear Age," *New York Times Magazine*, 29 October 2006. Retrieved on 25 August 2009, from <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/29/magazine/29islam.html>
82. Louis Rene Beres, "A New Military Reality: Existential Vulnerability Without First Losing A War," *PTSS DAILY* (21 April 2009): 61.
83. Celeste Katz and Corey Siemaszko, "NYPD, FBI Heroes Honored After Foiling Terror Plot to Bomb Synagogues," *New York Daily News*, 22 May 09. Retrieved 5 September 2009 from [http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny\\_crime/2009/05/22/2009-05-22\\_nypd\\_fbi\\_heros\\_honored\\_after\\_foiling\\_terror\\_plot\\_to\\_bomb\\_.html](http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2009/05/22/2009-05-22_nypd_fbi_heros_honored_after_foiling_terror_plot_to_bomb_.html). This article describes how the NYPD arrested a gang of homegrown terrorists. We get a sense of this notion that killing another human being—the ability to take life—produces intense excitement and a sense of grandeur. Committing murder becomes a thrilling decision. The suspects were ordered held without bail and branded anti-Semitic would-be killers who dreamed of basking in the glory of their spectacular attacks. "I hate those motherf---s, those f---g Jewish bastards," suspect James Cromitie told the informant, court papers revealed. "I would like to get [bomb] a synagogue." Cromitie eagerly anticipated watching the devastation he wrought played out over and over again on TV. "I'm the one who did that," Cromitie congratulated himself after the planned attacks, an informant told cops. "That's my work." The group's diabolical dream was to create "a fireball that would make the country gasp," a law enforcement source said. Even though cops called Cromitie the ringleader, David Williams was singled out as the meanest, bragging he would shoot anyone who tried to stop him.
84. Rahimullah Ysufzai, Harinder Baweja, Amir Mir, et al., eds., *Most Wanted: Profiles of Terror* (New Delhi, India: Roli Books, 2002), 44.

85. Nira Kfir, "Understanding Suicidal Terror Through Humanistic and Existential Psychology," in *The Psychology of Terrorism: Volume I, A Public Understanding*, ed. Chris E. Stout (Westport, T: Praeger, 2002), 143–157.
86. Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism." *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (July 1981): 379.
87. Nidal al-Mughrabi, " Hamas Official: Is Violence Palestinian 'Disease'?" Reuters, 17 October 2006. Retrieved on 25 August 2009, from <http://www.memeorandum.com/061017/p58#a061017p58>
88. *Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together*, ed. Paul K. Davis and Kim Cragin (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, RAND Corporation 2009), xxi–xlix.
89. Richard Miniter, *Losing bin Laden: How Bill Clinton's Failures Unleashed Global Terror* (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2003).
90. United Nations Development Programme Regional Bureau for Arab States, *The Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating Opportunities for Future Generation* (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2002), 27–29.
91. Alberto Abadie, "Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism," Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and NBER (October 2004): 1. Retrieved on 25 August 2009, from <http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~aabadie/povterr.pdf>
92. Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, "Who'd Be Female Under Islamic Law?" *The Independent*, 4 May 2009. Retrieved on 15 October 2009, from <http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/yasmin-alibhai-brown/yasmin-alibhaibrown-whod-be-female-under-islamic-law-1678549.html>. Safa Faisal, "Muslim Girls Struggle for Education," *BBC Arabic Service*, 24 September 2003. Retrieved on 25 August 2009, from [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/3130234.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3130234.stm). For a regional discussion of this "malaise" view, see "Algerian Author Anwar Malek: The Arabs Have Lost Their Worth, Their Humanity, and Their Culture," 3 March 2009, MEMRI TV Clip No. 2063. Retrieved 5 September 2009 from <http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/2063.htm>
93. Atlantic Council, "Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World," Executive Summary of the National Intelligence Council report of the same name, November 2008. Retrieved on 25 August 2009, from <http://www.acus.org/publication/global-trends-2025-transformed-world>
94. Jenkins, 51.